The Present Status of the Southeast Asian Refugees Under the 1980 Refugee Act: A Call for Reform by Klinek, Jan H.
THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE SOUTHEAST 
ASIAN REFUGEES UNDER THE 1980 REFUGEE 
ACT: A CALL FOR REFORM 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It has been almost fifteen years since the United States began 
dealing with the large numbers of refugees leaving war ravaged Vi-
etnam, Cambodia and Laos due to the rise of the Khmer Rouge led 
by Pol Pot.1 Many of the refugees sought "first asylum"2 in Thai-
land because of its close proximity to Vietnam and because many 
of them only desired a place for temporary refuge until adverse 
powers were driven out.8 The United States had an open and com-
passionate policy of admitting refugees.• Today, refugees leave 
these countries to escape reeducation programs implemented by 
the Soviet Union,5 to avoid guerilla attacks, and to find safer lands 
on which to live. 6 
1. Under the Khmer Rouge regime, Cambodia became known by its Khmer name, 
Kampuchea, and the full national name as recognized by the United Nations became Demo-
cratic Kampuchea. U.S. Committee for Refugees, Cambodians in Thailand: People on the 
Edge 1 (Dec. 1985). As of fall 1984, the United Nations decided to retain the standard west-
ern form of Cambodia, which will be used in this Note. Id at 1. In April 1975, the Khmer 
Rouge, Cambodia's Communist movement led by Pol Pot, stormed Phnom Penh and mis-
treated its inhabitants. Id at 4. In December 1978, Vietnam invaded Cambodia and drove 
the Khmer Rouge from power. Vietnam had initially supported the Khmer Rouge, but once 
Pol Pot was in power, Vietnam realized it could not control its leader and thus invaded. Id. 
at 4-5. 
2. "First asylum" is a term referring to the country which admits and gives refugees 
temporary permission to remain until another country has processed their claims and 
granted them permanent asylum. Fears of being left with a residual refugee population who 
will drain economic and social resources may encourage countries to limit access to first 
asylum in their nations. See Suhrke, Inda-Chinese Refugees: The Law and Politics of First 
Asylum, 467 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, 102-
03 (May 1983) [hereinafter Inda-Chinese Refugees]. It should be recognized that equitable 
sharing of the refugee burden is needed. Id. at 112-13. 
3. See generally G. KELLY, FROM VIETNAM TO AMERICA, 2-3 (1977)(chronicling the flight 
of Southeast Asian refugees in 1975). The refugees sought only temporary refuge until the 
Pol Pot regime was overcome, not a new home. Id at 2-3. 
4. In 1975 the U.S. admitted more than 135,000 East Asian refugees. Department of 
State Bureau for Refugee Programs, Refugee Arrivals in United States Fiscal Year 1975-
1987 (July). As of 1987, that number had fallen to a mere 23,407. Id. 
5. With the onset of glasnost, the Soviet policy of "openness" under Mikhail 
Gorbachev, Southeast Asians are more optimistic about their future. See N. Y. Times, Nov. 
24, 1987, at Al, col.2. Political, bureaucratic and economic relaxation are enabling these 
countries to emerge from their isolation, but such a metamorphosis will take time. See id. at 
Al2, col. 1. 
6. See Comment, Can the Boat People Assert a Right to Remain in Asylum, 4 U. Pu-
GET SouND L. REV. 176, 176-79 (1980)(discussing the lack of security experienced by South-
east Asian refugees facing forcible return to conditions they fled, the dangerous boat cross-
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Now, at a time when there is evidence of extreme overcrowd-
ing in refugee camps,7 Thailand has implemented a policy of 
pushbacks of refugees seeking entry and forced repatriation. 8 Ad-
ditionally, U.S. policy has become entangled in a nationwide con-
cern over the entrance of illegal immigrants. As a result of public 
pressure, a stricter admissions policy has developed. 9 
Such mass refugee migrations have challenged general princi-
ples and customs of international law which were designed for 
manageable numbers of refugees, not the large influx presently oc-
curring.10 As a result, it is necessary that several basic tenets of 
international agreements and conventions be reexamined. 11 Fur-
thermore, refugee policies need to address the limitations of the 
nations involved. 
The Refugee Act of 198012 is the cornerstone of U.S. immigra-
tion law regarding comprehensive resettlement and assistance. It 
professes to eliminate ideological and geographic restrictions from 
immigration policies and to focus on humanitarian concerns.13 Pol-
icy formation and long term implementation however are two dis-
ings, and ethnically motivated violence). See also N. Y. Times, N'ov. 25, 1987, at A9, col. 1. 
This article discusses the American antipersonnel bombs that fell on the Laotion people and 
their villages at the rate of 1,000 per person during the 1960's-70's. Many never exploded. 
Id. More than 4,700 people have subsequently been killed by the accidental detonation of 
these bombs. Id. 
7. Many Vietnamese boat arrivals have been housed in Phanat Nikhom. Though the 
camp was built to hold no more than 7,000 people, camp population is now at 11,000. See 
CERQUONE, Refugees From Laos: In Harm's Way, AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR NATIONALITIES 
SERVICE 1, 3 (1986) [hereinafter Refugees From Laos] 
8. See N. Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1988, Al, col. l, at Al5. United Nations refugee officials 
reported that at least 170 Vietnamese boat people have died off the coast of Thailand since 
the end of January 1988 after their boats were pushed off or intentionally rammed by Thai 
police, navy or fishing vessels. Id. at Al, col. 1. The Chief of police in Trat Province, where 
most of the newly arriving Vietnamese are detained, confirmed that 220 persons were 
pushed off in January 1988 and 233 in February. Id. at Al, col. 2; Al5, col. 1. 
9. See infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text. 
10. See Chamberlain, The Mass Migration of Refugees and International Law, 7 
FLETCHER FORUM 93, 94 (1983)(discussing the new demands of Third World refugees upon 
the world community and international organizations). Chamberlain proffers that 97 to 98 
percent of all refugees today are in developing countries and that the mass migration is not 
the result of temporary dislocations calling for only ad hoc measures. 
11. See infra notes 17-22 and accompanying text. 
12. Refugee Act of.1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 103 (1980) [hereinafter Refugee 
Act]. 
13. S. REP. No. 96-256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CoDE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 141, 142. The bill was created to give statutory meaning to our national com-
mitment to human rights and humanitarian concern. Id. at 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CoDE 
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 141. The bill does not explicitly define which refugees are deemed to 
be of special concern to the United States, but leaves this to be determined in the future. Id. 
at 6, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 141, 146-47. 
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tinct matters. 
The issue addressed here is whether the Southeast Asian refu-
gee has been fairly dealt with under the Refugee Act of 1980. Part 
II examines the purposes behind the Refugee Act of 1980. It will 
show how congressional intent has been displaced by a concern for 
meeting political and social pressures. Part III and Part IV set 
forth discussion and recommendations urging the renovation of 
U.S. refugee policies in order to alleviate the bias prevalent in the 
existing system. In addition, this Note recognizes the need to bal-
ance international humanitarian principles and national limita-
tions in order to develop, a means for equitably sharing the increas-
ing refugee burden. This discussion will conclude that the 
Southeast Asian refugee has become entangled in U.S. domestic 
and foreign policy goals, contrary to the objectives proffered by the 
Refugee Act of 1980. 
II. BACKGROUND 
There are at least two different ideological threads inherent in 
U.S. immigration policies. One is that the United States owes cer-
tain obligations to aliens by virtue of their humanity; the other de-
nies these responsibilities when it is not in the interest of the 
United States.14 Similar conflicts between national sovereignty and 
international obligati()ns l;ll'e evident throughout the world 
community.1a 
The Refugee Act of 1980 was established in order to show U.S. 
national commitment to human rights and humanitarian concerns 
not reflected in the Immigration Naturalization Act of 1952.16 The 
Refugee Act changed the legal status of refugees under U.S. immi-
gration law to coincide with internationally recognized guidelines.17 
14. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 
(1984)(discussing the new social reality in which immigration law must work and the ideo-
logical shift concerning the federal government's legal obligation toward individuals). 
15. Problems arise because nations must harmonize the individual's freedom of move-
ment with sovereign power, thus requiring the nation state to regulate and control people. 
See Chamberlain, supra note 10, at 94. 
16. See S. REP. No. 96-256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CoDE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 141. The Refugee Act recognized that "there is an urgent need for the United 
States to begin to take the steps necessary to establish a long range refugee policy; a policy 
which will treat all refugees fairly and assist all refugees equally, such a national refugee 
policy is now clearly lacking ... "Id. at 2, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS 141, 142. 
17. See generally Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature, 
July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter United Nations Convention] The United States 
became a party to the Convention on October 4, 1968. See 114 CONG. REC. 29, 607 (1968). In 
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The Act adopts a broader definition of refugee than does the 1951 
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees18 
and the 1967 United Nations Protocol19 because the Act allows 
persons still in their country of origin to be declared refugees by 
the President of the United States after consultation with 
Congress. 20 
In comparison, Canada,21 Switzerland,22 and many other coun-
tries favor the definition of refugee based on international guide-
lines. The 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol recognized refugees 
as a class known in general international law and, as a matter of 
law, entitled to protection and assistance when normal citizen-
state relationships collapse.23 Under customary international law 
these individuals are generally considered to have a right to non-
ref oulement. 24 In conjunction with this right, individuals also have 
a right to temporary refuge until a reliable determination can be 
made as to whether each applicant possesses a legitimate claim of 
persecution. However, the discretion used in rendering such a de-
addition, the United States signed the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.l.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 
(1967) [hereinafter United Nations Protocol]. 
18. The 1951 Convention declared that a contracting state can not expel or return a 
refugee to territories where his life or freedoms would be endangered. See United Nations 
Convention; supra note 17, at 176. The Convention referred to refugees prior to January 1, 
1951, thus dealing primarily with refugees of World War II. Id. at 153. 
19. The 1967 United Nations Protocol expressly incorporates the terms of the Conven-
tion in 1951, but requires that a refugee must have fled one's country prior to 1951. See 
United Nations Protocol, supra note 17, at 6225. T.l.A.S. No. 6577 at 3, 606 U.N.S.T. at 268 
(1967). 
20. See Refugee Act §207(e), supra note 12, at 103-104, which defines appropriate con-
sultation "with respect to the admission of refugees and allocation of refugee admissions, 
[as] discussions in person by designated Cabinet-level representatives of the President with 
members of the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and of the House of Representa-
tives ... " Id. at 104. 
21. Canada adopted the Convention definition in its 1976 Immigration Act. See supra 
note 18. Prior to 1976, Canada required special action by the federal government to admit 
refugees into Canada. See Stein, Commitment to Refugee Resettlement, ANNALS 187, 193-94 
(May 1983) [hereinafter Commitment to Refugee Resettlement]. "Until the refugee situa-
tion reached sizeable dimensions, they were not seen as part of the government's regular 
agenda ... "Finally, in 1979, Canada formally established annual refugee admission plans. 
Id. at 194. 
22. Switzerland developed the Convention definition in its recent law on asylum in 
1979. See Gooow1N-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (1983) [hereinafter Gooo-
WIN-GILL]. 
23. See id. at 18. 
24. Non-refoulement policy states that no refugee should be returned to any country 
where he or she is likely to face persecution or danger to life or freedom. See Refugee Act 
§203(e). The applicability of the rule distinguishes refugees from other aliens in the territory 
of a given state. 
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termination is problematic. H 
While many countries have instituted the core definition of 
refugee, an individual whose life or freedom is endangered by re-
maining in their country of origin,26 gray areas are evident. In prin-
ciple, a person becomes a refugee at the moment he or she satisfies 
the definition. Difficulties arise, however, when states decline to 
determine refugee status or when different determinations are 
reached by states and by the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).27 
The 1980 Refugee Act allows for discretionary determinations 
in awarding refugee status because the declaration of human rights 
in the Act does not have the force of law in the United States. The 
Act holds only that refugees have a right to enjoy asylum when a 
state confers it voluntarily.28 Hence, the United States may con-
cede to its biases and make status determinations out of conve-
nience because admission is discretionary. A group of persons seek-
ing entry may be classified as 'illegal immigrants,' 'quasi-refugees,' 
'aliens,' 'departees,' 'boat people,' or 'stowaways.'29 This result is 
inconsistent with the intent of the framers of the Act. 80 
Additionally, the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Cri-
teria for Determining Refugee Status81 describes some of the diffi-
25. See A. Helton, The Proper Role of Discretion in Political Asylum Determinations, 
22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 999, 1013-14 (1985). Helton argues that the "injection of discretion 
into the asylum standards threatens to swallow the right to apply for asylum in the United 
States." Id. at 1014. The use of discretion will cause refugees to run the risk of refoulement 
to countries of persecution. Id. at 1020. 
26. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text. 
27. See G.A. Res. 428(v), 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 46, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950). 
The UNHCR was established by the General Assembly to provide the necessary legal pro-
tection for refugees and to seek permanent solutions for the problem of refugees. According 
to its statute, the UNHCR is to be humanitarian and social. Id. 
28. See Refugee Act §208(a), infra note 53. 
29. See Gooow1N-G1LL, supra note 22, at 16, 19. Each classification imposes varying 
legal consequences. Illegal immigrants do not receive non-refoulement privileges like the 
refugees because they are not fleeing persecution. Id. at 73. There is an international obliga-
tion to provide for the safety of boat people when they are found floundering on the high 
seas, while stowaways may be detained by the flag country of the boat they are on and 
deported. Id. at 92. 
30. See supra note 13. 
31. Office of the UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Ref-
ugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees (Geneva 1979) [hereinafter Handbook]. The Handbook provides for a number of proce-
dural protections designed to prevent refugees from being arbitrarily refused asylum. The 
Handbook requires that if the applicant's account appears credible, he should be given the 
benefit of the doubt and allowed entry unless good reasons exist to the contrary. See id. at 
47-8. 
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culties experienced by aliens in pursuing their asylum claims due 
to language barriers, fear of authorities, and lack of proper docu-
mentary resources. Hence, international protection remains incom-
plete insofar as refugees and asylum seekers may be denied admis-
sion in ways not obviously amounting to a breach of international 
law.32 
Even though the Refugee Act emphasizes the need for nonide-
ological standards, 38 the second thread is more pervasive. Present 
practices reflect a response to the national desire for protection-
ism. 84 The standards of proof which refugees must meet in order to 
enter the United States (the refugee screening process) and the in-
fluence of foreign policy, all act as deterrents to the admission of 
refugees.H Additionally, the nonpolitical ideology of the Act is 
thwarted because the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS)36 is dependent upon the assistance of the State Department 
in rendering decisions on asylum claims. 37 
A. Standard of Proof 
During the past several years, the Supreme Court has handed 
down a multitude of decisions shaping the details of refugee law. 88 
In INS v. Stevic,88 the Court issued its first ruling on the Refugee 
Act. The Court focused on the textual differences between the 
granting of asylum and the withholding of deportation proceedings 
and suggested that the distinctions might warrant separate stan-
dards of proof concerning the probability of persecution. 40 As a re-
32. See supra notes 26, 29 and accompanying text. 
33. See supra note 16. 
34. See generally Schuck, supra note 14. 
35. See generally infra notes 43-78. 
36. The INS has the dual mission of providing information and service to the general 
public while concurrently exercising its enforcement responsibilities. It serves to administer 
and enforce the immigration laws, promote and protect the public health and safety, eco-
nomic welfare, national security and humanitarian interests of the United States. United 
States Government Manual 385-86 (rev. ed. June 1987). 
37. See infra notes 42, 47, 57-60 and accompanying text. 
38. See INS v. Assibi Abudu, 56 LW 4195 (U.S. March 1, 1988)(No. 86-1128)(after 
overstaying a student visa, a claim was made to seek asylum as a refugee for fear of life if 
deported. The Court looked to see if any new significant evidence arose as to danger which 
would excuse the student for not having filed for asylum originally); see also INS v. Car-
doza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407 (1984). 
39. 467 U.S. 407 (1984). Petitioner contended that the standard of "clear probability of 
persecution" needed to be met in order to support a withholding of deportation. See id. at 
413. Additionally, he argued that a finding of a "well-founded fear of persecution" required 
to support a claim for asylum, was synonymous with the aforementioned standard. Id. 
40. See id. at 424. 
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sult, the Court held the clear probability test applicable to depor-
tation decisions leaving the standard to be applied in asylum 
claims unresolved. 41 
The U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)42 continued to 
use the clear probability standard in deciding asylum claims until 
forced to revise its standard after the Court's decision in INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca.43 The Court declared that the congressional in-
tent behind the reference to "fear" in section 208(a) of the Refugee 
Act requires that eligibility determination turn on case by case ad-
judication looking at the subjective mental state of the alien. 44 
Section 208 (a)( 42) places a burden on asylum applicants, re-
quiring them to establish that they are unable to return to their 
country of nationality because of a "well-founded fear of persecu-
tion. "4 & Examined in the context of the general turmoil of the area, 
the burden to prove "fear" in an individual situation is substan-
tially less difficult than requiring an individual to prove that the 
"fear" is unique. 46 
The BIA, in determining whether an applicant has displayed a 
well-founded fear of persecution, adopts the general standard set 
forth in Guevara Flores v. INS.47 Guevara held that an applicant 
for asylum has established fear if he can show that a reasonable 
person in his circumstances would fear persecution. 48 Hence, there 
41. See id. at 430. 
42. The primary mission of the BIA is to ensure that immigration law receive uniform 
application throughout the United States. Congressional Quarterly Federal Regulatory Di-
rectory at 708 (5th ed. 1986). It is the highest administrative tribunal in the immigration 
field. Decisions by the BIA are usually binding unless modified by the Attorney General's 
office. Id. 
43. 480 U.S. 421 (1987). Petitioner claimed that she maintained a "well-founded fear of 
persecution" in that if she was deported, the Sandinistas would torture her until she told 
them the whereabouts of her politically active brother. See id. at 1209. 
44. See id. at 1212-13. See also Refugee Act §201 (a)(42), supra note 12, stating that a 
refugee is one who is "unable or unwilling to return to and is unable or unwilling to avail 
himself or herself of the protection of that country because of persecution or well-founded 
fear of persecution". 
45. Refugee Act §208 (a), supra note 12. See also 8 C.F.R. §208.5 (1985). 
46. The Reagan administration has recognized the need for general litigation to some 
extent. It has allowed certain persons who would not otherwise qualify for admission to be 
considered as refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States. See G. Me-
lander, 9 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 100 (1986). An example of such persons would be those 
in Vietnam and Laos with past or present ties to the United States and persons who have 
been or who are currently in reeducation camps in Vietnam or Laos. See Proposed Refugee 
Admissions for Fiscal Year 1988: Report to Congress 7. 
47. Guevara Flores v. INS, 786 F2d 1242 (1986) cert. denied, 480 U.S. , 107 S. Ct 1565 
(1987). 
48. See id. 
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is considerable ambiguity in the term "well-founded fear of 
persecution." 
Courts have held that the definition of "fear" can only be 
given meaning through an INS determination. •9 The Court in 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 50 
explained that an administrative agency must fill, by regulation, 
any gap left implicitly or explicitly, by Congress. Furthermore, the 
Court should respect and allow for statutory interpretation by the 
agency to which Congress has delegated the responsibility for ad-
ministering the statutory program. 51 This deference is conferred 
upon the INS because Congress has given this agency exceedingly 
broad discretion to implement its policies. 52 
After an eligibility determination has been made, the language 
used in section 208 of the Refugee Act must be examined closely.53 
A refugee eligible for asylum does not have a right to entry; final 
asylum decisions are instead granted at the discretion of the U.S. 
Attorney General (or his designee) and then delegated to the INS 
and immigration judge by regulation."" The determination of asy-
lum claims using the well-founded fear of persecution standard ap-
pears to be more ad hoc than the "clear probability" standard 
thus, allowing the discretion to be governed by foreign policy and 
national sentiment. 55 
B. Outside Influence 
U.S. admission of asylum seekers and refugees has been influ-
enced by foreign policy considerations and, in a number of in-
49. See supra note 36, 37 and accompanying text. See generally INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 
at 424. 
50. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
51. See id. at 843-44 (holding that the definition of the ambiguous term "major station-
ary source" was intentionally left vague by Congress in order that the an agency may create 
a sound definition of the term); See also Morton v. Ruiz 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974) (holding 
that the geographical limitations placed on general assistance eligibility was intended by 
Congress to mean "on or near"). 
52. See supra note 50, at 862; see also infra note 53. 
53. "The Attorney General shall establish a procedure . . . and the alien may be 
granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General deter-
mines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of [the Act]" [emphasis added]. See 
Refugee Act §208 (a), supra note 12; see also 8 C.F.R. §208.1 (a)(b)(1987). 
54. See Refugee Act, supra note 12. 
55. See generally Handbook, supra note 31, at 12-13. Asylum determinations should be 
based on factors such as an alien's character and background as well as the conditions of 
their country. Id. 
8
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 15, No. 2 [1989], Art. 8
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol15/iss2/8
1989] 1980 Refugee Act 293 
stances, has been an actual instrument of foreign policy.66 The U.S. 
State Department plays a decisive role in asylum adjudications, 
despite the need for separation of functions which is required by 
section 554(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),67 be-
cause INS agents do not consider themselves qualified to assess 
political and human rights conditions of various countries and still 
conform with the intent of Congress.68 
The State Department's Bureau of Human Rights and Hu-
manitarian Affairs (BHRHA) renders advisory opinions on asylum 
claims and evaluates applications on the basis of the information 
available to the State Department on the applicant's country. 69 
Bias is prevalent in these approval ratings because the human 
rights conditions in an applicant's country are analyzed by the 
country desk officer of the applicant's country of origin. 60 As a re-
sult, there is great potential for these officers to skew information 
and allow foreign policy considerations to enter into their decision 
making process in order to advance U.S. political ideologies. 
At the outset, refugees are divided into two groups: those flee-
ing from noncommunist regimes and those fleeing communist re-
gimes. 61 Inherent problems are evident when, in order to assess a 
refugee's claim of persecution, the State Department first attaches 
a label to the regime. 62 The label attached may be the result of 
56. See IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN, supra note 46, at 95, n.14 (opinion of Professor Aris-
tide R. Zollberg voiced at the Conference on Refugees and Right of Asylum in France and 
the United States held in Paris on March 14 and 15, (1985); see generally Chamberlain, 
supra note 10. 
57. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §554(d) (1977). "An employee or 
agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency in 
a case may not, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision . . . " 
58. Hence, the opinions of the State Department become "recommended" conclusions, 
making a mockery of the asylum determination process. See U.S. Committee for Refugees, 
Despite a Generous Spirit: Denying Asylum in the United States 29-30 (Dec. 1986). 
59. See Comment, Asylum Adjudications: Do State Department Advisory Opinions 
Violate Refugee's Rights and United States International Obligations?, 45 MD. L. REV. 91, 
109 (1986) [hereinafter Asylum Adjudications] (discussing the factors which impinge upon 
the determination of State Department advisory opinions in asylum adjudications). 
60. Country desk officers are concerned with the effects of their actions on U.S. policy 
toward their assigned countries. Furthermore, the inability of applicants to present their 
cases to or question those who prepare the advisory opinions is also inconsistent with no-
tions of due process. See Despite a Generous Spirit, supra note 58, at 30; see also Asylum 
Adjudications, supra note 59, at 110. 
61. See Note, Political Legitimacy in the Laws of Political Asylum, 99 HARV. L. REv. 
450, 462 (1985) (arguing that the deficiency of current asylum analysis is that it inquires 
into whether certain acts and conditions are legitimately political rather than whether they 
are politically legitimate). 
62. See U.S. DEPT. STATE BULL., 54, 55 (June 11, 1987). By labeling countries, the es-
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pure propaganda or public image and sentiment, favoring one 
group of refugees from a particular region over those from another 
region.63 For example, refugees from communist countries are pre-
sumed to be political64 and, as a result, are admitted more fre-
quently. 66 The present economic and social instability in the 
United States has further encouraged the practice of tainted dis-
cretionary decisions, limiting even the number of political refugees 
admitted. 66 Hence, it can be discerned that despite the desire to 
achieve a nonideological refugee admission's policy and the guide-
lines provided in the UNHCR Handbook67 requiring all nations to 
accord asylum applicants the benefit of the doubt unless good rea-
sons to the contrary are present, bias continues. 68 
An alternative to the present system of classification could be 
the creation of one specific criteria for determining whether perse-
cution exists. A standard definition should halt the equivocating 
which determines the success or demise of claims for asylum based 
on political grounds.69 Further, State Department advisory opin-
sence of the 1980 Refugee Act is undermined because asylum claims are treated differently. 
See supra note 16. Threats to the purpose of the Act are intensified by reduction in re-
sources available and an increase in the demand for those resources. U.S. DEPT. STATE BULL., 
54, 55 (June 11, 1987) (Statement by Jonathan Moore, Ambassador at Large and Coordina-
tor of Refugee Affairs). 
63. U.S. policy has provided easier entry and looser requirements for refugees fleeing a 
communist regime than it does for refugees fleeing a regime to which the United States is 
more ideologically sympathetic. See Chamberlain, supra note 10, at 104. Southeast Asian 
refugees must make out a claim of family ties and overcome adverse public sentiment. See 
Refugee Arrival, infra note 65. 
64. See supra note 61. 
65. See generally Refugees Arrival in United States Fiscal Year 1975-1987 (July), 
Dep't. of State Bureau for Refugee Program. 
66. See Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 1988, Report to Congress lOOth 
Cong., 1st Sess. 38. Appendix B: 
E.g., Admitted refugees from East Asia: 
1975: 135,000 1987: 23,407. 
Admitted refugees from Latin America: 
1975: 3,000 1987: 173. 
Another reason for discretionary decisions may be the effects of the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Act 1986 and deficit fighting efforts. The foreign affairs budget has come under 
severe strain. Also, the adverse public reactions to the large influx of refugees may simply be 
due to public weariness of the refugee problem. The masses look upon the refugees as a 
destabilizing force and a hinderance to progress and development. See Chamberlain, supra 
note 10, at 94. 
67. See Handbook, supra note 31. 
68. See id. 
69. Announcement of Ambassador Victor H. Palmieri, U.S. Coordinator of Refugee Af-
fairs (June 20, 1980). Procedures for processing applications are currently inadequate and 
difficult to implement. As a result of the complexity, the 1980 Carter administration by-
passed all processing requirements and created special Cuban/Hatian entrance designations. 
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ions should be replaced with file profiles of human rights condi-
tions in each country. 70 
It is highly probable, however, that these suggestions are not 
legal alternatives which the United States is willing to consider. 
When assessing refugee claims, statutory law and public policy 
may not be able to coexist. The Refugee Act, in this instance, may 
appear only to legitimize government action. 71 
Both International and U.S. law draw a distinction between 
refugees and immigrants but in practice, these groups are often 
treated as similar.72 Under the Reagan administration, U.S. immi-
gration laws were designed to focus primarily on deterring unau-
thorized entrance into this country.73 The Immigration Reform 
and Control Act of 1986 was enacted to control illegal immigration 
to the United States by establishing "penalties for employers who 
knowingly hire undocumented aliens, thereby ending the [employ-
ment] magnet that lures them to this country."74 
The Refugee Act, however, provides a legal mechanism for ad-
See id. 
70. See Scanlan, Regulating Refugee Flow: Legal Alternatives and Obligations Under 
the Refugee Act of 1980, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 618, 637 (1981). File profiles would provide 
only information about conditions abroad and their impact on U.S. foreign policy which was 
common to a number of applicants being evaluated. Thus, determinations would be free of 
the individual opinions of country officers and allow for more consistency. See id. at 638; see 
also 22 SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY 
AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST 169-171 (1981). 
71. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text discussing the influences of political 
ideologies and domestic pressures on the implementation of the Refugee Act. 
72. See generally Zucker, Refugee Resettlement in the United States: Policy and 
Problems, 467 ANNALS, 172, 181 (May 1983)(suggesting that the Reagan administration re-
duction and retrenchment on refugee policies was due to loss of compassion and fatigue of 
the issue on the part of conservative members of Congress.); see also Simpson, Immigration 
Reform and Control Act: Immigration Policy and National Interest, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 
147 (1984) (discussing the xenophobic climate in the United States); see also supra notes 
62-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the inherent problems of labeling regimes 
in order to assess a refugee's claim of persecution. See also infra note 73 for discussion on 
immigrants. 
73. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) Pub. L. No. 99-603, re-
printed in 1986 CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (1986). 
7 4. See id. at 5649-50. The legislative history of the IRCA states that many immigrants 
come from countries with high population growth and few employment opportunities and 
that the United States can not redress this imbalance by absorbing the foreign workers into 
our economy or population. See id. The legislative history continues that unemployment is 
much higher among the minority groups [and lower class citizens] with whom undocu-
mented workers compete for jobs most directly. See id. at 5656. Additionally, in March 
1984, Alan C. Nelson, INS commissioner praised the appeals court decision in Haitian Refu-
gee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982) when the court recognized that the INS 
need not inform every alien attempting to enter the United States that they have a right to 
apply for asylum. See Despite a Generous Spirit, supra note 58, at 12. 
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mitting an applicant who is the object of special humanitarian con-
cern. 75 The need for resettlement, not the desire of the refugee to 
enter the United States, is the governing principle behind the 
management of the U.S. refugee admissions program.76 
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 198677 has clari-
fied a great amount of the ambiguity surrounding admission of im-
migrants, but it appears that no adequate assurance can be given 
to ensure the examination of legitimate refugee claims. Although 
the two Acts attach to different groups and possess polar objec-
tives, public and official sentiment have become so concentrated 
around the desire to stem the arrival of immigrants that the num-
ber of legitimate arrivals under the Refugee Act are being 
limited.78 
III. THE REFUGEES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA 
There is presently an accelerating loss of safe asylum for refu-
gees in Thailand despite the fact that refugee protection and reset-
tlement needs remain undiminished. The number of Vietnamese 
boat refugees who have arrived in Thailand in recent months has 
more than doubled,79 with the present number of displaced persons 
living in the sixteen camps around Thailand estimated at 
370,000.80 
Despite these figures, U.S. policies of traditional resettlement 
have become increasingly restrictive. The U.S. government has 
75. See supra notes 12, 16, 17 and accompanying text for a discussion on the purposes 
for the creation of the Refugee Act and its effects. 
76. See Refugee Resettlement Program: Report to Congress, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 
(1987). It appears that Southeast Asian refugees with family ties in the United States are 
given priority by the United States. There is a proposed ceiling for the Orderly Departure 
Program of 8,500 persons departing from Vietnam, identical to last year's ceiling. This ad-
missions level demonstrates the importance the United States places on this program. 
Amerasians and former United States Government employees are also priority refugees. See 
Proposed Refugee Admissions, supra note 66, at 12. 
77. See supra note 73. 
78. See Appendix B, supra note 66; see also Kondracke, Politics, Mercy and Immigra-
tion: Moral Borders, THE NEW REPUBLIC, (Nov. 23, 1987). 
79. Between January and April 19, 1988, 2,231 Vietnamese arrived in Thailand. FBIS-
EAS-88, 19 April 1988 at 48. Additionally, 4,956 Vietnam boat refugees arrived during the 
first five months of 1987 as compared to 2,094 during the same period in 1986. See World 
Refugee Report, supra note 59, at 15. The Thai government will not take in these refugees 
for fear of ethnic conflict. Western countries, having absorbed hundreds of thousands during 
the 1970's appear to have lost interest; see generally L. HAWTHORNE, REFUGEE: THE 
VIETNAMESE EXPERIENCE (a collection of stories on people living in communist Vietnam and 
their subsequent migration). 
80. See 8 REFUGEE REP. No. 7, 10 (July 10, 1987). 
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proposed an admissions ceiling for East Asian refugees for the 1988 
fiscal year of 29,500. 81 This was a reduction of 2,500 from fiscal 
year 1987.82 The proposal attributed the decrease to the fact that 
camp populations in Southeast Asia have declined and that there 
were fewer qualified applicants.83 
Nevertheless, officials and their constituents argue that South-
east Asian refugees are still seeking entry into this country in un-
precedented numbers. 84 In recognition of the continuing need for 
refuge and for alleviation of the overcrowded refugee camps, the 
UNHCR signed an agreement with Thailand on April 20, 1988, 
providing for a new holding center for arriving Vietnamese boat 
people.86 Despite the increasing number of claimants, an applicant 
seeking refuge in the United States must also proceed through an 
exhaustive border screening process which often screens out eligi-
ble applicants for reasons inconsistent with the purpose of the 
process.86 
The purpose of the border screening process is to identify the 
Khmer Rouge who fled after the 1978 Vietnam invasion and pre-
vent their resettlement in the United States.87 The screening con-
sists of three steps. First, the Joint Voluntary Agency (an arm of 
the International Rescue Committee) identifies, intervenes, and ar-
ranges for refugee sponsorship. Second, a refugee suspect of being 
81. See Proposed Refugee Admissions, supra note 66, at 12. 
82. See id. 
83. In 1980, at the height of the refugee crisis in Southeast Asia, more than 90,000 
refugees left Thailand for resettlement in the United States. In 1985, fewer than 24,000 
refugees were able to leave Thailand for the United States. See Ranard, Thailand: The Last 
Bus, ATL 26, 28 (Oct. 1987). 
84. Thailand still has over 130,000 refugees, "a slight increase over the previous year." 
"More than 290,000 Cambodian "displaced persons" are on the Thai-Cambodian border 
with no option for resettlement in the West." See id. In addition to the rise in the number 
of boat refugees seeking entry, another reason for the increase could be that a solution to 
the long stayer problem is finally being examined. Long stayers are those who do not qualify 
as refugees, but are those for whom the United States has special humanitarian concern 
because they have been in refugee camps for an extended period of time. See Annual Con-
sultation with the Admin. on the Admission of Refugees in Fiscal Year 1987: Hearing 
Before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 94-5 
(1986). 
85. The new camp is planned to house up to 8,000 people and "will be built by the 
United Nations Border Relief operation along the Cambodian frontier south of Site 2 where 
the 290,000 displaced Cambodians live." See N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1988, at AlO, col. 2. 
86. See Staff Rep. of S. Comm. on For. Rel., 98th Cong., 2d Sess., United States Process 
of Khmer Refugees for Overseas Refugee Processing (Comm. Print Processing August 1983); 
see also Note, Rejected Cambodian Refugees: Prior Persecutors or Victims of an Illegal 
Screening Process?, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.J . 170, 181 (1987). 
87. See supra note 86. 
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Khmer Rouge, is sent to the Ethnic Affairs Office (EAO) of the 
Department of State Refugee Bureau for further screening. Third, 
the INS makes a final determination of an applicant's eligibility.88 
The Thai government introduced its own procedure for 
screening asylum seekers in 1985. 89 The process was designed to 
separate refugees from economic migrants and off er admission to 
the former.90 The United States further uses the procedure to 
screen out Khmer Rouge persecutors.91 Implementation of this 
procedure has resulted in a current INS rejection rate of over sixty 
percent for Lao refugees and of nearly fifty percent of the claims 
made by the Khao I Dang refugees. 92 
Moreover, it is evident that the initiative to expedite family 
reunification for Cambodians and Laotians with relatives in the 
United States, a policy serving a marginal number, has occurred at 
the expense of most other criteria and applicants. Although the 
proposed ceiling for the Orderly Departure Program in Fiscal Year 
1988 was meritorious (8,500 people), the program primarily bene-
fited those within specified groups. 93 It appears that present policy 
has been unfaithful to the original intent behind the Refugee Act 
Of 1980.94 
The Thai government responded to the diminished U.S. and 
world commitment to refugee placement by announcing the closure 
of Khao I Dang on December 31, 1986, the last place of safe asy-
88. See id. 
89. See CERQUONE, supra note 7, at 13. The Thai procedure was created in response to 
international criticism of the government's pushback policy and promised that the appli-
cants would be provided with a degree of order and safety. See id. 
90. See id. at 43. 
91. National Security Council Decision Memorandum 93, May 13, 1983, sets forth the 
guidelines. In recent years the predilection of INS decision makers is to assume applicants 
are guilty until proven innocent in order to limit the number of successful asylum claims. 
See Cambodians in Thailand: Refugee and Immigration Processing, IssuE BRIEF REFUGEES 
INT'L 2 (July, 1987). See also Rejected Cambodian Refugees, supra note 86, at 180. 
92. See Refugee Processing and Protection in Thailand, IssuE BRIEF REFUGEES INT'L 2 
(April 1987); see also Cambodian Refugees in Southeast Asia: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs House of Representa-
tives, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1985)(statement of Senator John Glenn: "I believe that the 
screening process has been inherently incapable of showing that an applicant was Khmer 
Rouge."). 
93. For a discussion of the Orderly Departure Program see infra note 118; see also 
Proposed Admissions, supra note 46. The Orderly Departure Program provides for the fol-
lowing qualified groups: (1) those meeting family reunification requirements, (2) former 
United States government employees, (3) Amerasian children and accompanying relatives, 
(4) former reeducation prisoners and accompanying relatives. See World Refugee Report 
(1987) 1, 15; see also IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN, supra note 46, at 64. 
94. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
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lum for Cambodians in Thailand.96 Its population of 25,000 was 
relocated to Site 2, an area one mile from the contested border 
zone where rival Cambodian factions, Vietnamese army units sta-
tioned in Cambodia, and Thai forces often exchange fire.96 
There have also been reports of forced repatriation and nu-
merous accounts of violence inflicted upon Cambodian civilians at 
the hands of Vietnamese soldiers, bandits, Thai rangers, and 
Cambodian guerilla forces. 97 Protection of refugees needs to re-
main a high priority in order for the United States to fulfill its 
commitment to the Thai government, the refugees, and the inter-
national community. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The legal labyrinth within which the refugee is caught consists 
of sentiments of national supremacy, concerns over economic sta-
bility, and humanitarian rights deriving from international law. In 
order to unite these principles, the world community should join 
together under an obligation to resolve the refugee problem, re-
gardless of which country is affected. The above discussion has 
shown that refugees are allowed to leave countries, but there is no 
guarantee that they will be allowed into another98 - the 1951 Con-
vention, the 1967 Protocol and the 1980 Refugee Act were not in-
tended to create individual rights, only to set forth humanitarian 
concerns. 99 
"First asylum" countries, like Thailand, should not bear the 
burden of placing Southeast Asian refugees;100 all nations must aid 
in the protection and placement of the refugees. A model for fu-
ture programs is demonstrated by the 560 member civilian unit 
which will be working under Task Force 80, a military unit, to pro-
tect the 290,000 refugees on the Thai-Cambodia border.101 This 
collaborative effort appears promising because it demonstrates that 
safety problems in refugee camps are being recognized and at-
tempts at remedies are being made. 
95. See 8 REFUGEE REP. No. 9, 5-6 (Sept. 11, 1987); see also Cambodians in Thailand, 
supra note 84, at 1. General Prime Minister Prem announced at the camp closure on De-
cember 29, 1986 "so many have promised and taken no action." 
96. See id.; see also supra note 8, at Al5. 
97. See Hearings on Admission, supra note 84, at 104-5. 
98. See e.g., Mass Migration, supra note 11, at 93. 
99. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. 
100. See supra notes at 21-31 and accompanying text. 
101. See FBIS-EAS-88-075 at 48 (April 19, 1988). 
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In the United States, prospects for reform are difficult to as-
sess because of the problem created by the large scale administra-
tion of the Refugee Act. Firstly, the INS must work within the 
confines of a changing federal budget and quota system.102 The 
limits created are not based on the amount of assistance needed, 
but on finances and public sentiment.103 Additionally, imprecise 
guidelines and foreign policy goals are major impediments to the 
proper implementation of the Act.10• 
The INS should be bound by the Administrative Procedural 
Act, section 554(d), which provides for the separation of functions 
when an agency is conducting formal adjudication.106 Despite the 
decision in Marcello v. Bonds, 106 in which the Court held that the 
deportation proceedings of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1952 superseded the hearing provisions of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, the Court discussed the extremely high risk of unfair-
ness inherent in combining the investigatory and adjudicatory pro-
cedures needed to assess refugee claims.107 
Under the Refugee Act, the decisional process concerning asy-
lum claims should occur independent of outside influences.108 The 
rationing and queuing processes established by the U.S. govern-
ment in handling asylum claims are obstacles to the independent 
determinations necessary for faithful implementation of the Refu-
gee Act.109 
Furthermore, nothing in current domestic or international law 
102. There does not appear to be a valid reason for making it more difficult for refugees 
to obtain admission merely because a new fiscal year has begun. See Regulating Refugee 
Flow, supra note 70, at 642. 
103. See id. 
104. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text discussing the inherent bias of advi-
sory opinions in evaluating an applicant's country and the influences of social and economic 
pressures on claim determinations. 
105. See APA, supra note 57. 
106. See Marcello v. Bond, 349 U.S. 302, 309-10 (1955). Petitioner, an alien, was con-
victed of violating the Marijuana Tax Act and, as a result, deportation proceedings began. 
The deportation order was challenged as a violation of the separation of functions require-
ment of the Administrative Procedure Act. 
107. To safeguard against a lack of fairness, the Administrative Procedure Act prohib-
its the combination of investigating and adjudication. See APA, supra note 57; see also IN 
DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN, supra note 46, at 36. 
108. See supra notes 13, 16 and accompanying text. 
109. See generally M. LIPSKEY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVID-
UAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980). By setting a ceiling on the number of refugees to be admit-
ted, creating an ordering process, and accepting refugees based on priority, the humanita-
rian purpose for the Refugee Act becomes subservient to numbers. 
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commits the United States to a policy of admitting refugees.110 As 
a result, an inefficient, ineffective policy has been established to 
meet humanitarian obligations. m One alternative to the execution 
of the present timely and costly process entailed in examining each 
refugee claim, could be the creation of a parole system whereby 
refugees are provisionally admitted until their ultimate legal status 
is determined. 112 
Another alternative may be to establish a standing require-
ment. A standing requirement would ensure that those who are in 
immediate danger of sustaining a direct injury, 113 not merely suf-
fering in some indefinite way common with the majority, are 
processed first. This would be a general policy applying to all coun-
tries and would thus help curtail the bias in processing claims. Ad-
ditionally, through the effective separation of the INS from the 
State Department, asylum determinations would return to the 
agency originally delegated to render such decisions. 
A. The Ray Panel Report 
In April 1986, the Ray Panel, a special independent panel ap-
pointed by the U.S. Secretary of State, was created to study the 
refugee situation in Southeast Asia.114 The panel recommended 
that the United States begin processing refugees from the current 
population without ties to the United States, taking into account 
the length of stay in camps and other compelling circumstances. 116 
Additionally, the panel suggested that conditions of the holding ar-
110. See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text. 
111. Refugee officials speak of three "durable" solutions to refugee problems: (1) volun-
tary repatriation; (2) settlement in the country of first refuge; (3) resettlement in third 
country. See The Last Bus, supra note 83, at 28. A durable solution means helping the 
refugees to become more self-sufficient, and enabling them to integrate and participate fully 
in the social and economic life of their new country. Id. To many refugees, these are non-
solutions, for they only wish to return to their country of origin without being singled out 
for harsh treatment. Id. 
112. See Regulating Refugee Flow, supra note 70, at 629-30. President Johnson's ad-
ministration used this process when it paroled over 168,000 Cubans. Act of November 2, 
1966 Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1611 (1966). A problem with this alternative is that indi-
viduals whose claims are denied might disappear into an underground system of hiding. 
113. See, e.g. , Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 448 (1923). Respondent chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the Maternity Act by saying that the appropriations provided 
by this Act and similar legislation falls unequally upon several states. 
114. See Refugees from Laos, supra note 7, at 16-17. 
115. See Hearings on Admission, supra note 84, at 103. Refugee processing and admis-
sions must remain available for those who qualify regardless of their location, date of arri-
val, and connections abroad. See also Cambodians in Thailand: Refugee and Immigration 
Processing, ISSUE BRIEF REFUGEES INT1L. 3, 5 (1987). 
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eas for applicants be improved. 116 
The panel also suggested that resettlement was not necessarily 
the appropriate solution for all refugees.117 Realistically, it is im-
practical, if not impossible, for the United States to grant immedi-
ate asylum to every applicant. Restrictions are necessary to ensure 
an orderly flow of deserving refugees.118 While applicants wait for 
the processing of their claims, or even before they have made a 
decision to flee their country, the United States and the world 
needs to direct attention to educating potential refugees in the 
hope of stabilizing their country of origin. 119 
By proposing that U.S. immigration policy be redirected so to 
lessen the influence the U.S. economy has on it, this Note does not 
argue that the United States should continue its policy of discour-
aging possible valid asylum claims. Policies need to be developed 
which would work to prevent the economic collapse of Southeast 
Asia. Policies should try to stem the migration of a country's 
strong economic work base and temper the deluded refugees who 
remain at the Thai border for years, waiting for their claims to be 
processed. 120 
Energies should be focused on minimizing the effect of ideolo-
gies and biases in asylum determinations. It is conceded that total 
objectivity is impossible; however, the United States should at-
tempt to return to the original intent of the Refugee Act of 1980.121 
B. The Role of Congress 
Although it is possible that Congress may not want to create 
116. See supra note 115, at 16. 
117. See Refugees from Laos, supra note 7; see also The Last Bus, supra note 111 and 
accompanying text. 
118. The Orderly Departure Program was established through an agreement between 
Vietnam and the UNHCR as part of the international response to the Indochinese boat 
people crisis of 1978-79. It is a critical element of the long-term solution to the Indochinese 
refugee problem. It provides a safe legal alternative method of emigration. The program 
interviews applicants and looks to the reasons for their departure rather than mode of de-
parture for bestowing refugee status (testimony of George Schultz, Secretary of State sub-
mitted to the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives on Sept. 23, 1987). Id. 
119. See generally Despite a Generous Spirit, supra note 58. One way to stem the flow 
of incoming refugees is to make their own countries economically appealing so that they will 
decide to stay and help develop their country. As a result of the surge in trade and com-
merce, their nation can grow and develop to offer residents opportunity. Id. 
120. Children are growing up in refugee camps without education, in crowded condi-
tions, never having the desire to work or knowing the feeling of permanent residence. See 
CERQUONE, supra note 7, at 14-15. 
121. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
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specific guidelines for determining the status of an asylum appli-
cant because noncommunists may be granted entrance more 
swiftly then the refugees from a communist regime, the increasing 
recognition and debate of the refugee problem by the Congress and 
the Senate may be viewed as a positive trend. The role of Congress 
is essential to clarifying the terms of the Refugee Act. Congress 
needs to make clear the items required to establish a "well-
founded fear of persecution. "122 While the definition of persecution 
must be specific in order to assure fairness of its application, some 
flexibility in favor of the applicant is needed. Flexibility may be 
necessary in order to abide with the Declaration of Human Rights 
displayed by the 1951 Convention, 1967 Protocol, and the Refugee 
Act.12s 
Congress should assert its authority in the area of asylum. It 
needs to monitor implementation of the refugee laws to ensure 
that the intent behind the Refugee Act is not frustrated. 124 Con-
gress should take action necessary to establish sound asylum poli-
cies. Biases will dissipate by limiting the discretion in determining 
refugee status and by not applying differing standards of proof to 
different applicants. Finally, the nation as a whole needs to be edu-
cated about refugees and how they differ from immigrants in order 
to change public sentiment toward the admission of refugees. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The United States must renew its commitment to the recogni-
tion that every person has a right to belong or emigrate to a coun-
try, to seek work, decent living conditions and freedom from perse-
cution. Domestic and foreign policy objectives should be secondary 
when determining whether an application for asylum warrants ad-
mission. The United States and the international community 
needs to come together and establish a means for equitably sharing 
the refugee burden. 
As the United States had an open and compassionate policy 
122. See FBIS-EAS-88-075, supra note 101. 
123. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text. All changes should reflect U.S. 
commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to treat individuals a particular 
way regardless of race, creed, sex, national origin, and political persuasion. The Refugee Act 
should explicitly mention the Khmer Rouge and delineate any criteria for determining con-
nections with the oppressive regime. Id. A data base should also be developed to assess 
conditions in the applicant's country of origin. Id. 
124. Congress can ask for annual reports detailing the criteria used by the INS to make 
asylum determinations. 
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for refugees over ten years ago, so too should it provide the protec-
tion and assistance duly owed to these people continuing to experi-
ence the repercussions of a war long finished, but still a prevalent 
part of their lives. · 
Jan Hillary Klinek 
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